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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LETTIE DELL BROCK,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

DEAN 0. 'V ARD and STATE
FARM. MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMP ANY,

Case No.
12737

Defendants-Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now respondent in the above-entitled matter, and with all due respect to this Honorable Court
and the individual Justices thereof, respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing in this cause for the following reasons and upon the following grounds:

POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN RENDERING ITS MAJORITY OPINION IN
THIS CAUSE BY FUNCTIONING AS
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AN APPELLATE JURY AND AS A
HESULT THEREOF EFFECTIVELY
D E N I E D RESPONDENT HER
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY BY
HER PEERS.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for a rehearing in this cause, that the matter be set for further
argument and that upon such rehearing this Court vacate its decision on file herein and affirm the jury verdict in the lower court and the judgment entered thereon.
FROEREH, HOROWITZ, PARKER,
THORNLEY &
CRITCHLO\V
By Richard H. Thornley

Attorneys for Petitioner-Respondent
2610 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN RENDER-
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ING ITS MAJORITY OPINION IN
THIS CAUSE UY FUNCTIONING
AS AN APPELLATE JURY AND AS
A RESULT THEUEOF EFFECTIVELY DENIED RESPONDENT HER
TO TRIAL BY JURY BY HER
PEERS.
This case does· not involve the usual questions on
appeal of inadmissible evidence being admitted at the
trial or improper instructions to the jury. Neither is
claimed by appellants. Appellants ask that this Court
review the facts contained in the record on appeal and
fincl respondent guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
This Court has held in numerous cases that the
factual question of contributory negligence becomes one
of law only where the evidence is such that reasonable
minds could not differ upon it.
It is difficult to believe that the foregoing rule of
law was followed in the majority opinion in view of the
numerous "reasonable minds" who not only could differ
but hm•e differed in this cause. The eight jurors in rendering their unanimous verdict are assumed to be average citizens of the community with reasonable minds.
The two experienced trial judges are presumed to be
reasonable by virtue of their positions on the bench. We
then have the opinions of the two distinguished and able
Supreme Court Justices who have indicated that reason-
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able minds could differ on the evidence and that the
\'erdict and judgment in the lower court should be affirmed.

It would seem that since twelve persons closely
connected with the case have differed as to the evidence
that this Court in rendering its majority opinion assumed'
another role than prescribed in the rule of law previously discussed. In reviewing the majority opinion and the
concurring opinion in connection therewith, it seems
apparent that this Court sat as an appellate jury in de- ,
termining the factual issues of this case.
The majority opinion discusses the facts of the
case and then determines that respondent was negligent
without ever treating the condition precedent to this,
i.e., could reasonable minds differ upon the evidence.
Also, the sudden glare aspect of the case is ignored,
which negates the testimony regarding such sudden
glare by the State Trooper, an independent witness who
arrived at the scene shortly after the accident and the
testimony of respondent herself. The majority opinion
then makes a somewhat conjectural conclusion that the
jury must have been swayed by empathy toward re·
spondent as against the insurance company. This in view
of the fact that many insurance companies desire to be
named defendants in cases, as was the case in this mat·
ter.
In the concuITing opinion to the majority opinion,
this Court assumes the role of a juror in stating, "Her
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self-ser\'ing testimony is unworthy of belief". This position overrides the prerogative of the trial jurors to determine which testimony is worthy of belief and also
overrides the jurors' action in believing such testimony
as well as the testimony of the independent witness and
the State Trooper regarding the sun conditions in that
particular area, at that particular time of the year, and
under those particular conditions.
The testimony of these three witnesses and the record are disregarded when this Court in effect takes judicial knowledge of the fact that a motorist could not be
r·n111<'ritnrily hlinded by the sun under the circumsta!lces
of this case. This is in direct contradiction to the testimony of the three witnesses and the record of the case,
and it would seem that the use of judicial notice was carried to the extreme.
If this verdict and judgment can be overturned in
the appellate court with a unanimous verdict and four
judges disagreeing, it would seem that no jury verdict
is safe or secure from reversal if a majority of three
judges in the appellate court view the facts differently.
It can be argued with some merit that such action is
ultra vires.
It is respectfully submitted that if the majority
deeision of this Court is allowed to stand, respondent's
right to a jury trial by her peers has been negated as
will future litigants since said decision encourages trial
judges to take cases from juries when they feel a
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strong personal compulsion as to what the decision should
be in the case. It is further submitted that the constitu.
tional right of jury trial, as provided in the Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 10, 78-21-1 and 78-21-2, UCA
1953, and Rules 38 and 39 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, should be enhanced rather than restricted.
CONCLUSION
Twelve reasonable minds have differed on the evi·
dence in this cause and there is no basis for conjecture
as to whether or not reasonable minds could differ.
Therefore, petitioner respectfully urges this Honorable
Court to protect her right to a jury trial and the fruits
thereof. Petitioner respectfully urges a rehearing in
this cause for the purpose of further consideration of
vacating the majority decision and the affirmation of
the jury verdict and the judgment rendered thereon in
the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
l'ROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER,
RICHARDS, THORNLEY &
CRITCHLOW
By Richard H. Thornley

Attorneys for Petitioner-Respondent
2610 Washington Blvd.

Ogden, Utah 84401

